India’s New Diplomatic Playbook: Hedging Across Powers and Institutions
Written byJanvi Singhi

India’s recent involvement with China and Russia, taking part in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and holding the presidency of BRICS might seem to signal a shift toward a China-Russia alliance in a world split in two halves. However, this narrows down the wider change in Indian foreign relations to simply a matter of alliance. Rather, India is increasingly practicing hedging across powers, institutions and capabilities. It is preserving relations with rival power centers, engaging on different platforms to achieve differing goals, and enhancing its own capabilities to enhance its options.
On the first level, India is handling competing great powers, without letting any partnership dictate its foreign policy. Its strategic partnership with the US and its role in the Quad coexists with continuous ties with Russia and attempts at building relations with China. These partnerships are fulfilling various functions. The US and Europe contribute to India’s technological and investment capabilities, give access to markets, and make it possible for India to engage in the Indo-Pacific. Russia is crucial in terms of defence and energy cooperation, while China poses a security issue and is also an economic partner that cannot be ignored.
This is a new chapter in the history of Indian foreign policy. The focus is now more on partnerships as means of achieving certain ends, rather than on partnerships as commitments that obligate countries to coordinate their positions on all issues. Cooperation with the US in the field of advanced technologies and maritime security is consistent with India’s cooperation with Russia in terms of defence and energy and negotiations with China aimed at reducing tensions on the border.
The India-China relationship serves as a clear example of this pragmatism. The agreement made about military patrols in Depsang and Demchok in October 2024 was an important step in the resolution of a military stand-off that began in 2020. However, disengagement should not be equated with reconciliation, as India recognizes the benefits of cooling down relations along the Line of Actual Control, which incurs costs of conflict on the economy, military and diplomacy. Thus, stabilization could be mutually beneficial without eliminating the necessity to compete on the strategic grounds.
According to C. Raja Mohan, discussing different relations between India, China, Russia and the United States, reveals structural reasons behind the pragmatism. Instead of maintaining equal distance from their competitors, India attaches different importance to different relations and acts accordingly.
Russia arrives at a different degree of calculation. India maintains its dependency on Moscow for defence platforms, energy and nuclear cooperation, while Russia sees India as an important commercial and strategic partner. But the increasing reliance of Moscow on Beijing complicates the situation between Russia and India and may limit Russia’s ability to act independently as a strategic pole. So India thus has a stake in keeping the relationship intact and diversifying its relations in the area of defence and energy.
The second tier works through institutions, which, according to its geographical interests, India is increasingly utilizing. The SCO provides India with a foothold in the Eurasian strategy, where both China and Russia have considerable power and influence. The importance of Central Asia, Afghanistan, terrorism, energy, and connectivity is significant for India, making it too important to be left completely to other powers. However, the major limitation comes from the economic power of China, Pakistan’s membership, and contradictions within the organization. Thus, being part of the SCO still allows India to have a say in Central Asian countries and the Eurasian security agenda. The analysis performed by Harsh V. Pant describes this dilemma: the SCO is important for India due to the fact that it is trying to pursue its interests in the Eurasian region, while the role of the SCO is limited.
BRICS serves a different purpose. This allows India to gain new ground among the developing countries and to stand up for the need to reform international institutions.The enlargement process of BRICS makes this task more difficult. Increased membership increases BRICS’ representative weight, but also brings conflicting interests and makes consensus harder. The careful assessment shows the contradiction between the growing significance of BRICS as an institution for multipolarity and the difficulty of reaching agreement among its members. The task for India is to use the group in situations where interests coincide rather than push for a consensus if there is none. Institutions thus become tools for specific issues instead of fixed geopolitical formations. The Quad, SCO, BRICS, G20, and different bilateral cooperation are all parts of India’s toolkit in dealing with the world: maritime cooperation through the Quad, Eurasian cooperation through the SCO, and cooperation with the Global South through BRICS.
The link between international policies and local capabilities is the essence of the third aspect. An example of the issue at hand is critical minerals. Although it is possible to expand the range of diplomatic ties, vulnerabilities caused by concentrated supply chains cannot be avoided, especially given that China has a unique edge in its capabilities to mine, process and refine relevant materials. The issue related to arms production is similar. While the need for domestic purchases is evident, the issue of technological complexity, scientific potential as well as the capability of the private sector and the entire industry to create advanced systems at scale is much more complicated.
Consequently, it is necessary to assess partnerships not only in terms of diplomatic or security aspects but also in terms of potential benefits for India’s technological, industrial, and economic development. The USA and Europe are important in terms of technology, investments, and markets, while Russia is needed for weapons and energy supplies and customers. Furthermore, China offers business opportunities together with considerable risks.
This method entails making tough choices, as India cannot make every relationship stronger at the same time. Therefore, where there is more collaboration with Washington, there might be problems with either Moscow or Beijing. India should enable business connections with China, but it should be remembered that this may result in weaknesses in the sides connected with the supplies. The growing partnership between Russia and China limits Moscow’s capacities, while BRICS enlarges India’s opportunities but raises the problem of coordination. Thus, the difficulty does not lie in making all partnerships equally strong, but in overcoming the problem of contradiction among collaborations during strategic interactions.
This is a crucial shift from foreign policies that relied mainly on non-alignment. Today, India seems prepared to explore several partnerships that may compete with one another, and work with countries both as partners and adversaries at the same time. More generally, the move is from alignment as a rigid choice toward partnership as a flexible tool. For the country, foreign policy is becoming more about taking advantage of relations, where their value changes depending on circumstances.
Ultimately, the success of the said approach depends on what can be gained from it. The place of the world’s largest countries in Eurasia could potentially grant India a share in the power of Asia in non-Asia; BRICS will contribute to its strengthening in the global governance system; Russia will be ready to sustain both energy and defense needs; and its Western partners will be happy to give India technologies, investments, and markets to use. However, goals must be advanced in order to say that such partnerships help to increase national power.
Therefore, India’s new diplomatic strategy does not entail selecting one external vendetta against another. Its approach is to work with multiple partners that can advance its national interests without allowing them to restrict its options. As a result, the success of India’s hedging strategy will not be measured in terms of the number of partners it has, but in terms of the number of options that its partnerships provide.
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Janvi Singhi
Janvi Singhi is a Senior Research Fellow at IndiaForth and Research Associate at Asia-Pacific Bureau of Organization for Threat Assessment and Peacebuilding (OTAP). She holds a Master’s degree in Political Science and is a Gold Medalist in International Relations. Her research focuses on geopolitics, geoeconomics, strategic affairs, India’s foreign policy, and specialising in Indo-Pacific and Indo-China relations.
Crux of the Blog
India is not joining a China-Russia camp. It is following a flexible “hedging” strategy: keeping ties with the US, Russia, and China at the same time, using each relationship for a different purpose, and protecting India’s freedom to choose.
The main idea
India’s foreign policy is moving away from old-style non-alignment, where a country stayed apart from power blocs. Now India works with rival powers when it benefits India, while avoiding dependence on any one of them.
Who gives India what
| Partner | What India gets | Main risk |
|---|---|---|
| US and Europe | Technology, investment, markets, Indo-Pacific cooperation | Pressure to align fully against China or Russia |
| Russia | Defence equipment, energy, nuclear cooperation | Russia is becoming more dependent on China |
| China | Trade and economic links | Border disputes, security threats, supply-chain dependence |
India talks to China to keep the border calm, but that does not mean trust or friendship; the two countries remain strategic competitors. Recent India-China talks focused on continuing border discussions and maintaining peace along the Line of Actual Control.
Why India joins many groups
- Quad: Helps India with maritime security and cooperation with the US, Japan, and Australia.
- SCO: Gives India a voice in Central Asia and Eurasia, where China and Russia are influential.
- BRICS: Helps India connect with developing countries and push for reform of global institutions.
- G20 and bilateral ties: Let India work on trade, technology, climate, and development with a wider set of countries.
India uses the SCO for regional security, connectivity, and counterterrorism, while also stressing that connectivity must respect every country’s sovereignty.
The difficult part
India cannot make every relationship equally strong. Closer ties with Washington may create friction with Moscow or Beijing; business with China can create supply-chain risks; and Russia’s closeness to China limits its independence. So India must balance these partnerships carefully rather than treat them all as equal.
In one line
India’s strategy is not “choose America, Russia, or China”—it is “use all useful partners, depend on none completely, and keep as many options open as possible.”